O\u27Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969): New Limitation on Court-Martial Jurisdiction by unknown
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 61 | Issue 2 Article 6
1970
O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969): New
Limitation on Court-Martial Jurisdiction
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969): New Limitation on Court-Martial Jurisdiction, 61 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci.
195 (1970)
THE JOURNAL OF CRImINAL LAW, CRIMINOLOGY AND POLICE SCIENCE
Copyright 0 1970 by Northwestern University School of Law
Vol. 61, No. 2
Printed in U.S.A.
O'CALLAEIAN V. PARKER, 395 U.S. 258 (1969): NEW LIMITATION ON
COURT-MARTIAL JURISDICTION
O'Callahan, a United States Army Sergeant
stationed in Hawaii, was arrested by civilian
authorities in Honolulu in 1956. While out of
uniform and off-post, he allegedly attempted to
rape a 14 year old girl. Apprehended by a hotel
security guard, he was turned over to city police.
On disclosing his military association, he was
released to military authorities.
O'Callahan was charged with attempted rape,
housebreaking, and assault with the intent to rape,
in violation of Articles 80, 130, and 134 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice.' After trial by
court-martial and conviction on all counts, he was
sentenced to ten years imprisonment at hard
labor, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and a
dishonorable discharge. Following unsuccessful
appeals to the Army Board of Review and the
United States Court of Military Appeals2, he
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the
10 U.S.C. § 880 (1950), provides in relevant part:
a) An act, done with specific intent to commit an
offense under this chapter, amounting to more
than mere preparation and tending, even
though failing, to effect its commission, is an
attempt to commit that offense.
b) Any person subject to this chapter who at-
tempts to commit any offense punishable by
this chapter shall be punished as a court-
martial may direct, unless otherwise specifi-
cally prescribed.
Id. § 930, provides in relevant part:
Any person subject to this chapter who unlawfully
enters the building or structure of another with
intent to commit a criminal offense therein is
guilty of housebreaking and shall be punished as
a court-martial may direct.
Id. § 934, provides in relevant part:
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter,
all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good
order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct
of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed
forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which
persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall
be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or
summary court-martial, according to the nature
and degree of the offense, and shall be punished
at the discretion of that court.
United States v. O'Callahan, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 568,
37 C.M.R. 188 (1967).
There are five steps in the review of a general court-
martial. The first review is by the convening authority
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (herein-
after U.C.M.J.) Art. 60. The convening authority is
the commanding officer of a unit. He submits the case
to the Battalion Judge Advocate General, who issues
an opinion under Art. 61 of the U.C.M.J. After re-
United States District Court, Middle District of
Pennsylvania.3 He contended, inter alia,4 that the
court-martial was without jurisdiction to try him
for non-military offenses committed off post while
on evening pass and in civilian clothes. The Dis-
trict Court denied relief5 and the Third Circuit
reading the transcript, the convening authority can
reweigh the facts, pass on the appropriateness of the
sentence, reduce the penalty, or change the finding to
"not guilty."
Next, the case goes to the office of the Judge Advocate
General under Art. 66. He reviews the case but has no
real power to change the finding of the lower court.
The Court of Military Review is the third step in
the appeals structure. It is composed of three qualified
lawyers, officers or civilians, serving short terms. The
appeal is automatic inter alia when the death penalty
is imposed. Under Art. 66(c), they weigh evidence,judge credibility of witnesses, and determine contro-
verted questions of fact.
The fourth step in the Military appeal structure is
the United States Military Court of Appeals. Art. 67,
U.C.M.J., established the Court, which is composed of
three civilians sitting for fifteen year terms. The accused
must petition for review but the Court must hear every
request for review involving capital sentences. Gen-
erally, review is limited to matters of law by Art. 69 (d);
but under extreme conditions, it can hear mixed ques-
tions of law and fact.
The President as commander-in-chief has final
appellate authority. But he, as any other appeal body,
cannot increase the court-martial sentence. M. Comisns
Am L. APoTHAxER, CRiuMNAL PRocEDuRE iN =
UNiTED STATES DISTRICT Ar MTrraay CoURTs, 172 ff
(1963).
3 The action was brought in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania because at the time O'Callahan was being
held at the U.S. Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pa. Parker
was warden there. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (federal habeas
corpus statute).4 0'Callahan also argued: (1) that his confession
was coerced (The army investigators allegedly told
him that if he confessed, he would not be militarily
charged or affected in any way; but they used the
confession against him); (2) that depositions of the
victim and certain other witnesses were improperly
introduced into evidence; (3) that he was denied his
right to trial by jury and his right to a unanimous
guilty verdict under Article III and the Fifth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. United States
ex rel. O'Callahan v. Parker, 256 F. Supp. 679 (M.D. Pa.
1966).
5 Apparently, O'Callahan unsuccessfully argued the
case on the same grounds in a petition for habeas corpus
filed in the United States District Court for Massa-
chusetts. O'Callahan v. Chief U. S. Marshall and
Department of Army, Misc. Civil. 66-8W (1966). This
court refused to consider the second petition on the
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Court of Appeals affirmed.6 The Supreme Court,
however, reversed on the ground that courts-mar-
tial of soldiers for crimes cognizable in a civilian
court and not militarily related are beyond the
intended scope of Article I, section 8, clause 14 of
the United States Constitution.7
Clause 14 gives Congress the power to make rules
for the governing of the land and naval forces and
is a grant of authority for establishing military
courts-martial to administer the rules.0 The effect
is to create a unique jurisdiction for military courts
which is separate and independent from the civilian
court system. Traditionally, the Supreme Court
has reviewed only jurisdictional questions in
connection with courts-martial.9 In the case of
basis of 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1964) which reads in relevant
part:
No circuit or district judge shall be required to
entertain an application for a writ of habeas
corpus... if it appears that the legality of such
detention has been determined by a judge or
court of the United States....
6 United States ex rel. O'Callahan v. Parker, 390
F.2d 360, 364 (3rd Cir. 1968). The court affirmed on
the basis of the similarity between this case and the
one decided in Thompson v. Willingham, 318 F.2d 657(3rd Cir. 1963), in which the court upheld a decision
which ruled that the U.C.M.J. applied to all soldiers
on active duty.
7395 U.S. 258 (1969).
8 Not all procedural protections deemed essential in
civilian courts need apply. The Fifth Amendment
inferentially exempts "cases arising in the land and
naval forces, or in the militia in actual service in time
of war or public danger," U. S. CONST, Fifth Amend-
ment, from the right to trial by jury. 395 U. S. at
261. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, 40 (1942).
9This includes whether the court was properly
constituted, whether it had jurisdiction over the offense
and the person convicted, and whether the sentence was
authorized by law, Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U. S.
122 (1950); See Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879).
Habeas corpus is the proper method for attackingjurisdiction of a military tribunal in a federal court,
E parke Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); and it is
recognized by statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The Con-
stitution, in fact, is held to have conferred no power to
review courts-martial determinations except as it has
been granted judicial power (through Congress) to
grants writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an
inquiry into the cause of the restraint of liberty. In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). A military tribunal may
not be attacked directly, i.e. by certiorari, Ex partk
Vallandigham 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863). The writ
,ian, however, be used for attacking a district court's
decision concerning the petition for a writ. See Burns v.
Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
Habeas corpus requires exhaustion of all other
relevent procedures. This means that an accused soldier,
for instance, must appeal to the camp commander, the
Judge Advocate General of the Army, the Army Court
of Military Review, and the United States Court of
Military Appeals before he has any tight to file a writ of
habeas corpus. The ruling is directly analagous to
Hiatt v. Brown, even though substantive unfairness
was evident on the face of the record, the Court
denied habeas corpus because the trial level court-
martial had heard the objections and, after inves-
tigation, rejected them." As a matter of dictum,
the Court announced, however, that if first-level
court-martial procedure proved grossly unfair,
jurisdiction is spoiled with reference to that court.
If it has no jurisdiction, then review is available
through the federal courts after exhaustion of all
existing remedies n
In the absence of such prejudicial procedural
error, jurisdictional questions are confined to those
arising from interpretation of Clause 14. In the
bounds of this narrow framework, the Supreme
Court has exhibited considerable concern over the
rights of persons subjected to military law. Because
it has no power to conduct a direct review, the
Court has not corrected violations of due process
by ordering revised court-matrial procedures.
Instead, it has acted on a case-by-case basis to
limit military jurisdiction to the narrowest pos-
sible scope. In this respect, O'Callahan can be
viewed as only part of a continuum of cases in
which a growing disquietude with military proce-
dure has resulted in the Court stripping from the
military much of its jurisdiction. O'Callahan holds
that a soldier who commits a crime while off duty,
outside the confines of a military base, and out of
uniform must be tried in a civilian court. The
Court stated that military jurisdiction is confined
to those cases involving crimes actually related to
functioning of the military in some direct way.
The first indication of judicial dissatisfaction
with military law surfaced in Mr. justice Murphy's
dissent in Wade v. Hunter.12 There, the Court held
administrative law exhaustion of remedies doctrine.
See Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683 (1969); Gusik v. Schil-
der, 340 U.S. 128 (1950).
10 339 U.S. 103 (1950).
1 It is beyond the scope of this note to inquire into
proposed liberalization of the use of the writ of habeas
corpus in military cases. This inquiry is strictly limited
to the new jurisdictional test in O'Callahan. For a
general discussion of recent procedural developments,
see Katz and Nelson, The Need for Clarification in
Military Habeas Corpus, 27 OHIo ST. L.J. 193 (1966).
12336 U.S. 684, 692 (1949). Petitioner was charged
with rape and assault with the intent to rape. He was
convicted by a military court-martial and sentenced.
The action for a writ of habeas corpus was denied by
the district court, 72 F. Supp. 755 (M.D. Pa. 1947).




that the rule against double jeopardy18 need not be
complied with if military expediency 4 requires
reconvening an already completed court-marital
proceeding. Justices Murphy, Douglas, and Rut-
ledge believed, contrary to the feelings of the
majority, that military courts should not have a
free hand in dealing with accused soldiers and that
the Fifth Amendment cannot be circumscribed for
the sake of military expediency.' 5
Advocating general review wherever the military
courts did not fairly and conscientiously apply the
standards of due process, Justices Douglas and
Black dissented in Burns v. Wilson.16 They con-
demned practices leading to coerced confessions
and convictions based on violations of due pro-
cess.'7 And to insure that military courts-martial
followed all Supreme Court standards of judicial
fairness, they called for review of all proceedings
involving violations of due process i
However, the majority in Burns expressed their
confidence that military courts were qualified to
review their. own proceedings and rule fairly on
accusations of unfairness arising from their rulings.
They listed in detail reforms in the system which
"Double jeopardy, a single sovereign, trying some-
one more than once for a single act, most often is
alleged in the military context for crimes such as "con-
duct unbecoming a soldier," or "breach of military
discipline." Such an accusation is usually made after a
soldier has been convicted in some civilian court of a
felony or relatively serious misdemeanor.
24The armed forces require, as recognized by the
Supreme Court, the Constitution, and Congress, a
certain amount of discipline beyond that demanded of
civilians. The military must be a close-knit, authori-
tarian organization since the exigencies of battie call
for the highest degree of cooperation among men. See
note 45 infra.
15 336 U.S. at 694. The Fifth Amendment specifically
excludes cases arising "in the land and naval Forces."
This exclusion provides the basis for a constitutional
argument that the military infrastructure has the
general power to discipline its troops. The question
becomes the implications of "in," and this is the issue
to which the Court really addresses itself.
16346 U.S. at 150. Petitioners were found guilty of
murder and rape and sentenced to death. They ex-
hausted their right to appeal in the military appeals
system and then applied for habeas corpus on claims of
substantive unfairness. The district court dismissed
the application, 104 F Supp. 310 (D.D.C. 1952); the
court of appeals affirmed, 202 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
7346 U.S. at 153.
18 justice Douglas said,
If the military agency has fairly and conscientiously
applied the standards of due process formulated
by this court, I would agree that a rehash of the
same facts by a federal court would not advance the
cause of justice. But where the military reviewing
agency has not done that, a court should entertain
the petition for habeas corpus, Id. at 154.
contributed to its fairness. 9 Because the court-
martial had heard and ruled on the objections, the
Court felt that there was no ground for review in a
civilian court.'0
Through Justice Black, a dissentor in Burns, the
Court in United States ex rel. Totk v. Quarles,21
revised the "hands off" attitude exhibited pre-
viously in Wade and Burns and began the process
of restricting court-martial jurisdiction. The Court
held that a discharged serviceman was not subject
to a military court-martial for a crime committed
while on active duty.so Both parties relied heavily
upon historical arguments and upon Article I,
section 8, clauses 12 and 14 of the Constitution; 3
but the case turned on a finding that courts-mar-
tial are substantially unfair when compared with
Article I civilian courts. The Court said:
And conceding to military personnel that high
degree of honesty and sense of justice which nearly
all of them undoubtedly have, it still remains true
that military tribunals have not been and probably
never can be constituted in such a way that the
19 Id. at 141. Reforms listed are:
1) the right to prompt arraignment;
2) the right to counsel of one's own choosing;
3) the right to secure witnesses and prepare an
adequate defense;
4) the right to appeal a decision through a hier-
archy of military appeals boards;
5) the right to a trial free from command influence.
The reforms were part of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, which replaced the Articles of War in
1950 (Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 108).
20Professor Jaffe agrees with the dissent. He says:
It is not unusual for special bodies to vindicate
their own procedures, thus review (by the court-
martial) without retrial (by the reviewing court)
may not be a very effective protection. L. JAFFE,
JuDIcrM CONTROL op A mmsRrv ACTION
369 (1965).
Professor Jaffe is discussing Burns v. Wilson in this
section. It is not uncommon to construe courts-martial
to be administrative agencies by reasoning that they
are an arm of the executive for the purpose of disciplin-
ing the armed forces. Wncrmop, MiuxARy LAW AND
PRECEDENTS 32 (1886). For'a modem view of this
argument, see Note Military Law-The Constiution v.
Congress, 12 N.Y.L.F. 459 (1966).
1350 U.S. 11 (1955). Five months after he was
honorably discharged from the United States Air
Force, petitioner was arrested by military authorities
and charged with conspiracy to commit murder while
on active duty. He was taken to Korea to stand trial
before a court-martial under U.C.MJ. art. 3 (a), 10
U.S.C. § 803 (a). The court of appeals sustained the
act, 215 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to pass on the jurisdictional question,
348 U.S. 809 (1954).
2350 U.S. at 23.
2Brief for petitioner at 14, 23; Brief for respondent




Constitution has deemed essential to fair trials
of civilians in federal courts.'4
Because of this shortcoming, the Court reasoned
that military jurisdiction was not appropriate for
trying a discharged serviceman. Dissentor Justice
Reed (joined by Justices Burton and Minton,
members of the majority in Burns) argued that the
court-martial was deeply rooted in history and that
Congress did have authority to define jurisdiction
under Article I, section 8, clause 14 of the Consti-
tution. Moreover, he stated that the Uniform
Code of Military Justice 15 was compiled in such a
manner so as to "assure that the military justice of
the unified services would be in accordance with
present-day standards of fairness." 2
6
In 1956, the Court temporarily halted the pro-
cess of limiting court-martial jurisdiction. In Reid
v. CoverP and Kinsella v. Krueger,28 it refused to
allow civilian dependents of American servicemen
living in foreign military bases the right to civilian
trials for capital offenses committed by them while
outside the country. Justice Clark, who wrote the
2350 U.S. at 17. Specific deficiencies listed by the
majority were:
a) military courts emphasize retribution, notjustice;
b) there is no tenure for those performing judicial
functions in the army, they can be removed at
will;
c) judicial officers are appointed by military
commanders;
d) salaries of the judges are not protected as in
civilian judiciary;
e) trial by jury is vastly different (and more fair)
than is trial by military tribunal.
2Enacted May 5, 1950.
26 350 U.S. at 26. Note the clear difference in points
of view as to the substantive fairness of the U.C.M.J.
351 U.S. 487 (1956). The dependent wife of an
Air Force Sergeant was tried and convicted by a military
court-martial in England for the murder of her husband
there.
"351 U.S. 470 (1956). Pursuant to U.C.M.J. art.
2(11), 10 U.S.C. § 802(11), a wife of an army officer was
convicted of her husband's death.
Article 2(11) reads in relevant part:
The following persons are subject to this chapter
... (11) Subject to the provision of any treaty or
agreement... all persons serving with, employed
by, or accompanying the armed forces without the
continental limits of the United States.... Id.
Jurisdiction is granted by foreign countries through
Status of Forces Agreements, see note 92 infra. Here it
reads in relevant part:
... the United States Service courts and authorities
shall have the right to exercise within Japan ex-
clusive jurisdiction over all offenses which may be
committed in Japan by members of the United
States' armed forces, the civilian component, and
their dependents.... 3 TIA 3353 (Part 3, 1952).
Burns majority opinion, overlooked procedural
miscarriages, going no further than to say that
jurisdiction can be exercised on dependents over-
seas under Article I, section 8, clause 14. Specifi-
cally, he relied on In re Ross 9 for the proposition
that constitutional protections apply only to per-
sons actually in the United States or there for
trial.
Early in the next term, the Court reheard Reid
and Kinsella and reversed the stand it had taken
previously. 0 In the second Reid case, the Court
again criticized the narrow scope of military pro-
cedure and its failure to provide civilian type pro-
tections." It characterized the Uniform Code of
Military Justice as "harsh law... frequently cast
in very sweeping and vague terms.... It also
virtually overruled In re Ross in the process.33
Justice Harlan, who changed his previous stand to
make the reversal possible, stated that capital
cases require especially senstive standards for
procedural fairness which can only inhere in a
civilian court where the judge and the trier of fact
are not responsible to the convening authority. 4
Despite these frontal attacks on military pro-
cedure, the Court did not forbid those procedures
which it found repugnant, as it probably would
have done with the procedures of some lower fed-
eral or state court.5 Because of the traditional
prohibition against reviewing court-martial deci-
sions and procedure, the Court here, as in Toth,
reacted by limiting jurisdiction of the military
court sufficient to exclude the petitioner.
Later in the same term, Justice Clark reversed
his previously unyielding stand and wrote the
opinion which extended the jurisdiction of an
Article III court to civilian dependents living over-
29 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
0 354 U.S. 1 (1957). Justice Frankfurter suggested
rehearing.
3" Id. at 36-40.2 Id. at 38. The Court also stated that military
law ".... emphasizes the iron hand of discipline more
than it does the even scales of justice... ." Id. at 38.
3 The Court says:
The Ross case is one of those cases that cannot be
understood except in its peculiar setting; even then
it seems highly unlikely that a similar result would
be reached today. Id. at 10.
4Id. at 77. Justices Clark and Burton dissent hold-
ing their previous position that the grant in Article I
was sufficiently broad to allow Congress to include
civilian dependents in military jurisdiction.
" See e.g. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967)(error in admission of evidence of a lineup); Klopfer v.




seas and charged with non-capital crimes." His
changed position was due to the persuasiveness
of the Reid opinion and his own misgivings about
permitting the military to exercise unreviewable
jurisdictional discretion over civilian defendants
merely by lowering the offense to some non-capital
charge. This, he said, would operate to strip the
accused of constitutional protections.P Justice
Frankfurter dissented, contending that military
courts were competent to deal with all cases other
than those involving the death penalty. As to
capital offenses, Frankfurter agreed' s that a court
more responsive to the subtleties of criminal pro-
cedure is necessary.
In two subsequent cases, the Court further
limited court-martial jurisdiction by removing
the power to try civilian employees of the armed
services working on United States military bases
overseas. The prohibition extended in one case to
capital offenses"9 and in the other to non-capital
crimes." In so doing, the Court refused to accept
specific arguments that courts-martial proceedings
are fair,4" and it prepared for O'Callahan by
requiring that military jurisdiction must be
limited to the least power adequate to promote
military discipline
2
O'Callahan is the latest case in this group and
again the Court makes clear its dissatisfaction with
the military system by saying that "courts-mar-
tial as an institution are singularly inept in dealing
with the nice subtleties of constitutional law." 41
As before, the Court responds by excluding peti-
tioner from military jurisdiction.
Theoretically, the Court could be criticized for
its methodology in dealing with the problems in
military law. Arguably the most thorough and
equitable way of approaching the problem would
be for the Court to disregard the ban on direct
review of military procedure and eliminate each
procedural shortcoming as it is presented rather
36Kinsela v. U.S. ex Rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234
(1960). The wife of a serviceman abroad was convicted
of unpremeditated murder in connection with the death
of her child. She filed a writ of habeas corpus and was
released by the district court. The warden of the federal
penitentiary brought the appeal.
7Id. at 244.
8 See 354 U.S. at 41-64.
9 Grisam v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960).
40 McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361
U.S. 281 (1960).41 Brief for respondent at 15, McElroy v. United
States ex el. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
42361 U.S. at 280.
41395 U.S. at 265.
than collaterally narrowing the breadth of military
jurisdiction.
However, the Court's approach is more respon-
sive to the problem than appears on first impres-
sion. Article I, section 8, clause 14 does provide
Congress with the exclusive power to make rules
relating to the land and naval forces. Coupling
Clause 14 with the Necessary and Proper Clause,"
the retributive nature of the military legal system
is tolerable insofar as it is necessary for the efficient
disciplining of troops in the military establish-
ment.45 The Court, then, has recognized this need
by refusing to reform a system required for efficient
military operation. When it recognizes that the
system has clear procedural shortcomings, it
strips from the military court-martial all but
militarily essential jurisdictional powers. Starting
with Toth and moving to O'Callahan, the Court
has taken an increasingly restrictive view of the
quantity of jurisdiction essential for military
operation 46
The test is not one of pure military expediency,
however. Before coming to that question, the
Court will make preliminary inquiries. In Reid v.
Covert, for example, the Court never reached the
4U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
45 See U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955):
Court-martial jurisdiction sprang from the belief
that within the military ranks there is a need for
a prompt, ready-at-hand means of compelling
obedience and order. Id. at 22.
[The exigencies of military discipline require the
existence of a special system of military courts in
which not all of the specific procedural protections
deemed essential to Art. M trials need apply.
395 U.S. at 261.
The purpose of the military establishment is the
effective waging of battle at the front lines. When the
enemy is in open confrontation, insubordination,
individuality, or personal preference could needlessly
endanger the entire unit as well as jeopardize the
mission of a unit. Soldiers must be trained to act as a
single group if campaigns are to be successful.
Military discipline is also necessary for other reasons.
With a large number of persons eating, sleeping, work-
ing, and playing together, the absence of tight order
could result in frequent fights, destruction, thefts, and
desertions.
This, in turn, would cause the moral of the troops to
be seriously impaired. Not only would they lack security
from personal and physical attacks, but there would be
a noticeable lack of group feeling, affecting quality of
work, stamina in battle, and personal interdependence.
46 Turning military tribunals into Article III courts
complete with all civilian safeguards is not the answer
to the problem. Military exigencies require that there
be an efficient and speedy method of handling military
discipline. See note 45 supra.
19701
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Necessary and Proper Clause argument. It held
that Article I, section 8, clause 14 did not apply to
the defendants as a matter of jurisdiction because
their civilian status excluded them from the "land
and naval forces."47 Moreover, the defendants
in Toth v. Quarles avoided military jurisdiction
because of their non-military status. The relation-
ship between good order and discipline and the
individual crime was never discussed. O'Callahan,
though, could not meet the status test; and as a
consequence, the Court's ruling was based on the
failure to establish the requisite military neces-
sity s
This approach was not new. As early as the
second Reid case, the Court had questioned
whether jurisdiction was "necessary and prop-
er." 49 In addition, Justice Harlan in his dissent
in Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton de-
nounced the majority's reliance on status as the
only test. He said that the words "land and naval
forces" do not set a strict limitation as to inclusion
or exclusion. 5 Justice Harlan further decided that
in order for courts-martial to exercise their right
to adjudicate cases involving the military, the
relation between military discipline and the soldier
defendant must be so close that
in the light of all the factors involved, [Congress]
appropriately deems it "necessary" that the
military be given jurisdiction to deal with offenses
committed by such persons.5'
The Court's holding is also supported by a
comparison of Article I, section 8, clause 14 with
other specific grants of power to Congress in section
8. There is a difference in emphasis. For instance,
Clause 10 authorizes Congress to "define and
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the
high seas ..... 52 Clause 4 gives Congress power to
establish bankruptcy laws;-" and Clause 6 grants
the privilege to define and punish counterfeiting
47354 U.S. at 21. The Court later said:
We have no difficulty in saying that such persons do
not loose their civilian status and their right to a
civilian trial because the government helps them
live as members of a soldier's family. Id. at 23.
,8395 U.S. at 274.
49 354 U.S. at 20.
50 361 U.S. at 253-5.
" Id. at 257.52 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (emphasis added).
IId. cl. 4, which reads in relevant part: "establish
... uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies;"
(emphasis added).
of United States currency.5 But Clause 14 provides
not for punishment of military personnel or for
defining of laws to govern them, but for the making
of rules for the specific purpose of governing and
regulating land and naval forces. The purport
of this clause in this light is to grant a very limited
criminal jurisdiction-an authorization to pro-
mulgate rules and regulations governing only that
conduct which has some special relation to the
armed forces. 55
What O'Callahan has decided is that because
there are inherent injustices in the military court-
martial system, trial in civilian court is preferable
whenever possible. In the opinion, Justice Douglas
points specifically to several glaring injustices:
the presence of command influence; the absence
of impartial judiciary, jury trial, and grand jury
indictment; the emphasis on retribution instead
of justice and rehabilitation; and the difference
in procedural and evidentiary rules. 5 Although he
criticizes the military for these short-comings,
he also admits that the system is needed for the
narrow purpose of maintaining discipline.
Because of its broad scope and hazy language,
the case generates new problems which are not
handled in the opinion. 7 Justice Harlan in his
'AId. cl. 6, which reads in relevant part: "To provide
for the Punishment of counterfeiting current Coins of
the United States:" (emphasis added).
5 Id. cl. 14, which reads in relevant part, "to make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces:" (emphasis in text added).
The military might successfully argue that within
certain limits, strict military laws could have sub-
stantial relation to the proper government and regula-
tion of the armed forces, and, therefore, fall within the
scope of Clause 14. Justice Clark would take this view.
He says that the
[P]ower to make "Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces" bears
no limitation as to offenses. The power there
granted includes not only the creation of offenses
but the fixing of the punishment therefore. 361
U.S. at 246.
But so long as a crime has no direct relation to the
maintenance of good order and discipline, nor any
deterrent effect within the military itself, the inclusion
of a broad spectrum of crimes may serve to deprive a
person of his rights as a citizen merely because he was
"in" the army. Duke and Vogel, The Constitution and
the Standing Army: Another Problem of Court-martial
Jurisdiction, 13 VANm. L. Rv. 435, 457-58 (1960).
56395 U.S. at 264.
5 Douglas also relies unnecessarily on historical
analysis-that the Framers' intent was to severely limit
Congress' ability to add new categories to court-martialjurisdiction. 395 U.S. at 268-72. History should not,
however, be controlling, much less the sole guide to
constitutional interpretation. See Home Building and
Loan Ass'n v. Blaiselell, 290 U.S. 398, 443 (1933).
Other criticism could be levied against Douglas'
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dissent recognizes this shortcoming.51 He com-
plains that the Court does not explain the scope
of the phrase "service-connected crimes," but
merely glosses over a comprehensive definition
in reaching its conclusion.A9 The present state of
confusion in military courts justifies his position.
Two days after the O'Callahan decision, the
Judge Advocate General of the Army issued an
opinion. He states that military courts are unfair be-
cause the judge does not have life tenure and guaranteed
salary. Id. at 264. In doing so, however, he fails to
point out that the same could be said of many state
courts. Similarly, he holds that civilian courts are
superior because the right to grand jury indictment is a
foundation stone of the system. Id. at 262. He does not
mention that the Constitution does not grant the right
to a grand jury indictment "arising in the land or
naval forces." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. Therefore, it is
far from a fundamental right.
These criticisms are undue. Justice Douglas is not
claiming that all civilian courts are without blemish by
comparison but only that military courts lack importantsafeguards.
Arguably, also, Douglas prejudicially applied a
balancing test in O'Callahan. The decision could be
construed as a balancing between military necessity
and personal rights. If this is so, then Douglas is unfair
to the military side. He carefully lists all the considera-
tions in favor of extending personal rights but super-
ficially passes over military necessity arguments. But
this case does not apply an orthodox balancing ap-
proach at all. Douglas attempts not to do that but only
to very strictly limit military jurisdiction.
Finally, Justice Douglas fails to state whether the
decision is retroactive to previously committed service
unrelated crimes. This is a substantial problem since
an estimated 450,000 courts-martial involving 4000
prisioners may be invalid under O'Callahan. There is a
strong argument to be made in favor of applying the
decision retroactively since the O'Callahan court rules
that the military courts have no jurisdiction over non-
service related crimes. If they have no jurisdiction,
then as a matter of law, the proceedings held under
them would be invalid. However, the effect of accept-
ing this argument would be to put the civilian courts to
a substantial burden in retrying these cases. See Nelson
and Westbrook, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Service-
men for "Civilian" Offenses: An Analysis of O'Callahan
v. Parker, 54 MIu. L. REv. 1, 39-46 (1969); Comment
Note-Prospective or Retroactive Operation Of Overruling
Decision, 10 A.L.R. 3d 1371.
Is Id. at 274 and forward.
59 The majority listed a group of conditions for testing
service connection, but the list was not by any means
exhaustive. These are:
a) being properly off duty;
b) no connection at all between military duties and
the crimes in question;
c) crime not committed on a military post or
enclave, nor was any other military person af-
fected;
d) the location of the offense is not an armed camp
under military control;
e) there was no war and the civil courts were open;
f) the offense occurred on U.S. soil; and
g) there was no flaunting of military authority and
no endangering of security or property of a
military post. Id. at 273.
order commanding that his subordinates follow a
very narrow reading of the O'Callahan opinion. 0
He urged that waiver of jurisdiction to civilian
authorities over servicemen's offenses be held to a
minimum. He further suggested that the test for
"service connection" be any clear relation to
military effectiveness or in the alternative any
identification with the military organization, i.e.
uniform, car bumper sticker, military vehicle, and
so forth. The Judge Advocate decided that the
decision applied only within the United States
and then only to cases directly similar to O'Calla-
han.61
The three-man United States Court of Military
Appeals, while not applying the Judge Advocate
General's test, could not agree on the meaning of
O'Callahan. In United States v. Borys,6 the majority
nullified the finding of a court-martial of a soldier
who had committed sex crimes off-base. They
relied entirely on O'Callahan. But Chief Judge
Quinn, dissenting, found O'Callalan to be such a
radical departure that he would greatly limit its
application.63
He interprets the decision as holding that both
civilians and soldiers are to be treated equally
'0 JAJG 1969/8399, June 4, 1969, 5 C=. L. Rpm.
2229-30. Specifically, the court-martial can exertjurisdiction, according to this release if,
a) the offense is committed against a military
person or government property,
b) the offense is committed on base,
c) the offender is on duty,
d) the offense is purely military,
e) the offense is outside the United States, and
f) there is a factual relation to military effective-
ness.
'It is not unreasonable to infer that the Judge Advo-
cate General is construing the holding very narrowly to
create more habeas corpus actions in federal court.
This in turn would result in a more precise definition
of the holding. See e.g., DA 91 375, Communication
from W. J. Chilcoat, COL, JAGC, Chief, Military
Justice Division, OTJAG to all army commands,
passim but esp. page 4.
The Judge Advocate General does make it clear that
the jurisdictional question should be carefully analysed
before proceeding with trial to avoid de novo post-trial
inquiry. He places responsibility for this job with the
military judge. Department of the Army Pamphlet
27-69-15 page 17, Headquarters, Department of the
Army.61 See note 60 supra.
6218 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 40 C.M.R. 257 (1969). Peti-
tioner roamed through Georgia and South Carolina
committing rape, robbery, sodomy, and attempts to do
each on female victims. The accused wore civilian
clothing, he was off-duty, and he drove a private
vehicle. The only identifying characteristic was his
auto bumper sticker. He was first tried and acquitted
by civilian authorities and then subjected to a general
court martial.63Id. at 550.
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when they commit the same criminal act."4 The
question in the case according to Quinn is framed
to provide that the criminal act must be "eogniza-
ble in civilian court", 65 arguing that the Supreme
Court is likening the situation of a civilian charged
with a crime to the plight of an accused soldier.
Then he infers, that if a crime is not recognized in
civilian court but is included in the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, ipso facto, the offense gains
military significance. Since no civilian is faced with
such hypothetical charges in a particular state, no
equal treatment is necessary. 66 Therefore, Congress
intended exclusive military jurisdiction whenever it
enacted statutes peculiar to the Uniform Code
alone.
In summary, Chief Judge Quinn creates a
bifurcated test by adding the "cognizable in
civilian court" requirement to the "service con-
nected" requisite. The operation of this bifurcated
approach raises a presumption in favor of military
trials by making it necessary for the accused to
show that a crime is cognizable in civilian court.
Furthermore, the only civilian court qualified
to hear the case under the reading of O'Callahan
is a federal district court.6 O'Callahan says nothing
which would deny Congress the right to prescribe
a criminal code for persons in the military service;
it only speaks to the proper forum for trial. The
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution6s precludes
state law from preempting a similar federal law.
And from this Quinn reasons that since federal
courts have concurrent original jurisdiction in all
cases arising under federal law, the federal district
court is the court of first impression in a case
involving a soldier committing a non-military
crime.6
Since it was unnecessary for the Supreme Court
6Id.
65 Id. citing 395 U.S. at 261. The only time this
phrase is mentioned by the Supreme Court is in the
early pages of O'Callahan. The question is framed so
that it is included.
66 18 U.S.C.M.A. at 551.
67 This effectively eliminates trial in civilian type
court with civilian type trial for American soldiers
stationed abroad.
6U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, which reads in relevant part:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;
... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; ....
To make this argument, Quinn assumes his own
interpretation of "cognizable in a civilian court."
69 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1948), which provides in relevant
part:
The district courts of the United States shall have
original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the
States, of all offenses against the laws of the United
States.
to reach the questions of "court" and "body of
law" because O'Callahan occurred in the territory
of Hawaii, Quinn's approach is not merited. The
only courts in the area were federal courts, and
the only law in question was federal law.70 As a
consequence, Justice Douglas never needed to con-
sider the conflict of forum or laws problems.
The majority of the United States Court of
Military Appeals has articulated no one test in
the light of the bifurcated approach of the dissent
in Borys5l In United States v. Prather72 they listed
three alternative criteria for establishing the
required connection to the army-breach of mili-
tary security, a flaunting of military authority,
or an effect on military property. The existence
of any one factor would prove sufficient to place
an alleged criminal properly in military court.
This test was derived from a portion of the O'Calla-
han opinion 3 The identity of the victim in United
70 18 U.S.C.M.A. at 552.
71 Besides those mentioned in the text, the following
decisions have been made by the U.S.C.M.A. since
O'Callalhan: United States v. Beeker, 18 U.S.C.M.A.
563, 40 C.M.R. 275 (1969), possession of marijuana
off post considered a crime cognizable under the
U.C.M.J. because of the effect of smoking pot on
health, morals, and fitness (Chief Judge Quinn writ-
ing for the majority); United States v. Burkhart
(U.S.A.F. Bd. Rev.) 5 Cum. L. RpR. 2421, July 27,
1969, bigamy is "service connected" because of many
benefits accorded serviceman's dependents by armed
services; United States v. Reid (U.S. Navy Bd. Rev.),
5 Cans. L. RPm. 2329, June 11, 1969, using LSD off
base service connected; United States v. Chandler, 18
U.S.C.M.A. 593, 40 C.M.R. 305 (1969), burglary off
base unrelated to military; United States v. Riehle,
18 U.S.C.M.A. 603, 40 C.M.R. 315 (1969), bringing
stolen goods on base does not furnish service connec-
tion; United States v. Paxio, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 608,
40 C.M.R. 320 (1969), on base robbery of civilian
service connected; United States v. Crapo, 18
U.S.C.M.A. 594,40 C.M.R. 306 (1969), soldier commit-
ting violent assault on base and then robbery off base
as a result of the assault is triable in a court-martial;
United States v. Williams, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 605, 40
C.M.R. 317 (1969), passing bad checks at post exchange
is service connected; United States v. Henderson, 18
U.S.C.M.A. 601, 40 C.M.R. 313 (1969), off base carnal
knowledge of serviceman's daughter is not service
connected; United States v. Smith, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 609,
40 C.M.R. 321 (1969), on base carnal knowledge in
government housing is service connected ("The need
to maintain security of a military post is suffi-
cient...."); United States v. Shockley, 18 U.S.C.M.A.
610, 40 C.M.R. 322 (1969), on base sodomy in govern-
ment housing is service connected, off-base is not; and
United States v. Harris, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 596, 40 C.M.R.
308 (1969), espionage is service connected.
7218 U.S.C.M.A. 560, 40 C.M.R. 308 (1969).
The Court stated:
The offenses did not involve any question of the
flounting of military authority, the security of a
military post, or the integrity of military property.
395 U.S. at 274.
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States v. Guntner'4 was the most important con-
sideration. If the person was a civilian, the military
could not reach the crime. If however, the victim
was a member of the armed forces, then there was
sufficient relation to military expediency to justify
a court-martial. The Court reasoned that there
was overwhelming military necessity because the
person victimized loses at least some of his effec-
tiveness as a soldier. In another case, United
States v. Andin,75 the majority left the determina-
tion of "service connection" to the trier of fact.
The majority of the United States Court of
Military Appeals specifically disclaims the bi-
furcated approach"L-that if a general military
regulation exists, the case may be tried in a mili-
tary court, regardless of its "service connection,"
unless there is a special federal law like it. They
say that if this were true, the armed services could
easily circumvent O'Callahan and its limited
definition of Congress' power under Article I,
section 8, clause 14,7 especially considering that
the federal criminal code is at best incomplete.
It would be necessary only to alter the definition
of a crime slightly so that it would be like no crime
"cognizable in civilian court."
Although it is true that the decision has led
to several inconsistent interpretations it is also
probable that the decision cannot fairly be emascu-
lated by the use of narrow judicial interpretation,
as Chief Judge Quinn and the Army Judge Advo-
cate General would prefer. The Court in O'Callahan
reiterates its conviction, expressed in Toth, that
[flree countries of the world have tried to restrict
military tribunals to the narrowest jurisdiction
deemed absolutely essential to maintaining disci-
pline among troops in active service....
Determining the scope of the constitutional
powers of Congress to authorize trial by court-
martial presents another instance calling for
limitation to the least possible power adequate to the
end proposedY7
This least possible power doctrine is dearly in-
consistent with the bifurcated test. Indeed, the
precedent relied upon by the Court79 included all
7' (U.S. Army Bd. of Rev.), 5 Cme. L. Rrm. 2401,
July 11, 1969.
75 18 U.S.C.M.A. 520, 40 C.M.R. 232 (1969). The
result of the remand is not available.
78 United States v. Castro, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 598, 40
C.M.R. 310 (1969).
7 Id. 18 U.S.C.M.A. at 600.
78 395 U.S. at 265 citing 350 U.S. at 22-23.
71 The Court found that in pre-revolution England
and America courts-martial were always viewed with
suspicion. Id. at 268. As per tradition, the British did
crimes which had a direct impact on military
discipline. For example, shooting a civilian with
the intent to kill is purely a civil crime, but shoot-
ing a prisoner while standing guard in a military
stockade is a crime and a breach of military
discipline80 The Court believes that the Toth
approach will best effect its purpose of providing
every member of the armed services the benefits
of an indictment by a grand jury and a trial by a
jury of his peers whenever possible.8'
An interpretation of the Court's language and
reasoning points to the conclusion that the Justices
intended to delimit Congressional powers, not
that they wished to decide a conflict of laws ques-
tion between military and civilian courts. Not-
withstanding this, the bifurcated approach leads
to the assumption that the determinations of
Congress are sacrosanctP This is erroneous since
the Supreme Court believes that the power of
Congress to make rules for the armed forces under
Article I, Section 8, clause 14 is strictly limited by
a soldier's right to a jury trial. A narrow inter-
pretation such as the bifurcated approach could
scarcely stand for such a proposition.
Under these circumstances, the meaning of the
phrase "cognizable in civilian court" is dear. The
Supreme Court is not trying to limit its decision
but is merely making an exception for the type
of crime which has a purely military purpose. For
instance, the crime "conduct unbecoming a sol-
dier" is peculiar to the military system. This is
not to say that other crimes become militarily
related upon the showing that technically they
are different from the same crime in civilian court.
Statutory rape, for example, is not a military
crime merely because the military sets a lower age
cut-off than any state. This crime is of the type
cognizable in a civilian court; consequently, it
cannot be tried by the military, absent a showing
of service connection.
not try soldiers for ordinary crimes committed in the
British Isles. Id. at 269. And the Continental Congress
was viewed as following this tradition. Id. at 271.
'1 395 U.S. at 271 n. 16 citing Ex parte Mason, 105
U.S. 696, 698 (1881). HIistorical arguments may not be
relevant in deciding current questions; but what the
Court thought history said is germane to interpreting
the Court's opinion.
s1 Id. at 273.
1 Judge Quinn says,
On the authority of this language alone (Art. I, § 8,
cl. 14 and 17) it would appear that the right of Con-
gress to define criminal conduct for the Govern-
ment of the armed forces is as broad as its power
to legislate for the territories, which, I pointed
out earlier, is as extensive as the power of a state to
define a criminal code. 18 U.S.C.M.A. at 555.
The test most consistent with the intent of the
Court is the one articulated by the majority of
the United States Court of Military Appeals,
which calls for determination as to a breach of
military security, a flaunting of military authority,
or an effect on military property8 or military
personnel. 4 The majority's experiment in re-
manding to the trier of fact85 for a determination
as to "service connection" 86 is analogous to allow-
ing the jury to apply the "reasonable man" test
to negligence cases. Because "service connection"
is a mixed question of law and fact, this procedure
would substantially avoid the problem of inter-
preting the phrase. But possibilities of abuse of the
holding in O'Callahan are great if the determina-
tion is placed in the hands of the body the Court
found "singularly inept"--the first round court-
martiaLn
Assuming that O'Callahan's impact is to limit
Congress' military jurisdiction, courts must apply
present state and local rules of criminal procedure
to select the appropriate trial court. The soldier
is to be tried for service unrelated crimes as if
he were a civilian under civilian laws and rules
of criminal procedure.4 The bifurcated test does
not lead to this result because the doctrine fails
to put the decision in its broader perspective as a
limitation on Congressional power to grant mili-
tary jurisdiction.
1 United States v. Prather, supra note 73 at 561.
I"Guntner, 5 Cnmr. L. PTR. 2401.85 The first level military court-martial.86 United States v. Anclin, supra note 76 at 520.
7 395 U.S. at 265.
88 If a soldier is wrongly brought for trial in military
court, however, he cannot remove to a civilian court
until after he has exhausted his remedies in military
courts. This means appeal through to the United States
Court of Military Appeals. See note 2 supra.
The military wishes to avoid de novo hearings in
civilian court and as a consequence requires careful
determination of jurisdiction before proceeding with a
court-martial, see note 60 supra.
Moreover, since the United States Court of Military
Appeals declared that it has power to issue extraordi-
nary writs under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651,
United States v. Frischholz, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 150, 36
C.M.R. 306 (1966), accused can petition directly to
that court for a writ of habeas corpus if he has a juris-
dictional issue (Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683 (1969),
approved this assumption of power).
A recent district court opinion challenged the doctrine
of exhaustion of remedies on the ground that a con-
stitutional question should go directly to the federal
courts for disposition, Moylan v. Laird, 6 Cnms. L.
RPTm. 2138 (D.C. R.I. October 20, 1969). But that case
is inconsistent with Noyd; and moreover, there is a
strong argument in favor of allowing the military
system a chance to sift through their own cases before
federal relief can be sought.
Even if the United States Court of Military
Appeals' test is adequate under the decision, there
are still unresolved jurisdictional questions. The
Court is unclear as to whether the decision applies
outside the jurisdictional boundaries of the United
States in the first place. It is true that in its
listing of conditions at the end of the opinion,
the Court says:
[W]e deal with peacetime offenses, not with author-
ity stemming from the war power. Civil courts
were open. The offenses were committed within
our territorial limits, not in the occupied zone of
a foreign country.8'
But this statement, taken as a whole, speaks more
to the problem encountered by advancing armies
in occupied foreign territory than it does to offenses
committed during peacetime by American soldiers
located in foreign nations. Moreover, applying
by analogy the Court's prior decision affecting
dependents and government employees outside
the United States,90 the Court means to give all
servicemen the same rights as afforded servicemen
inside the United States. The implication of the
decision is that soldiers committing civilian crimes
must be treated as civilians. Civilians in foreign
nations are granted civilian trials; and therefore,
soldiers outside the United States committing
non-military crimes must receive civilian trials as
well. The Court does not intend that a person,
merely because he is outside of the United States,
becomes automatically subject to a different
standard. It demonstrated this in cases prior to
O'Callazan by deciding that each citizen under
United States jurisdiction must receive the same
protections everywhere as he does in the United
States. 98
89 395 U.S. at 273-4.
90 See text supra.91 See note 35 supra. In re Ross was overruled.
There is probative circumstantial evidence for the
proposition that the judge Advocate General of the
United States believed that O'Callaan had extra-
territorial application. He advised the military judge
"as a matter of prudence" to make a full inquiry into
the jurisdictional facts of a case even when a court-
martial is to be conducted for a crime committed
outside the United States. Department of the Army
Pamphlet 27-69-15, page 17.
The United States Court of Military Appeals settled
the question for the military in United States v. Neaton,
6 CRT,. L. Rpm. 2156, November 14, 1969. The court
held that courts-martial have jurisdiction over all
crimes committed by U.S. soldiers outside the United
States. They argued that it would be better for a soldier
to be subjected to a court-martial than a trial in foreign
court or no trial at all.
The court's decision is impliedly based on their
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If this is true, then, a court or system must
exist or develop to fill the "jurisdictional gap"
created by restricting military jurisdiction.4
Possibilities are advance waiver of procedural
rights, host country prosecution, domestic trial in
federal district court, overseas trials by itinerate
civil courts, and extraterritorial trial by special
courts convened.'" Advance waiver may have
"duress" and "knowledge" problems from a con-
stitutional standpoint. Foreign courts dislike
assuming the job of policing American citizens;
and foreign law, procedure, and penal systems
are often substantially different and sometimes
significantly inferior by American standards.94
Trial by itinerate or special courts face potential
undue influence in the military milieu, problems
in procuring adequate unbiased jurors, and poten-
tial conflicts from recalcitrant host powers. Domes-
tic trials are difficult to arrange because they in-
volve long distance transportation of witnesses,
prosecution personnel, and defense counsel.9 For
felonies, however, this procedure seems necessary
previous decision that any crime on a military base is
ipso facto service-connected, United States v. Smith,
18 U.S.C.M.A. 609, 40 C.M.R. 321 (1969), and on the
premise that a foreign court will automatically assume
jurisdiction in all off-base crimes. The first assumption
still has not been decided by the Supreme Court. The
second assumption is probably not true, see text
supra.
'2 This dilemna only exists for those crimes which
are of no real concern to foreign governments. If an
American commits espionage, for instance, a foreign
power will naturally assume jurisdiction over the
individual.
Such matters are governed by Article VII of the
Status of Forces Agreements. Under these treaties, the
United States reserves exclusive jurisdiction over
persons, and offenses they commit, under military law.
For all other offenses, i.e. those committed under the
law of the host country, the country has jurisdiction.
A problem arises when the offense would be punishable
under both American and foreign law. Although juris-
diction is ostensibly concurrent, a primary jurisdiction
is assigned to United States courts in cases of offenses
solely against the security or property of the United
States, or against the person or property of American
personnel, or action arising in pursuance of official duty.
Naturally, host allies often give great weight to requests
of the United States authorities. C. EvEPrr, MrLITARY
JUSTICE DT THE AxmED FoRcEs or = UNITED STATES,
41 (1st Ed. 1956). See note 31 supra.
91 See Note, Civilian Dependents and Employees at
Overseas Bases Not Subject to Court Martial Jurisdiction,
46 VA. L. Rnv. 576, 582-87 (1960); Ehrenhaft, Policing
Civilian Accompanying the United States Armed Forces
Overseas: Can United States Commissioners Fill the
Jurisdictional Gap, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 273, 280-83(1967); Note, Courts-Martial Jurisdiction Over Civilians
in Peacetime, 20 MD. L. Rxv. 338, 342 (1960).
94 See Note, Courts-Martial over Civilians in Peace-
time, 20 MD. L. REv. 338, 342 (1960).
95 Id.
to realize the intent of O'Callahan. For misde-
meanors, where penalties are minimal, United
States Commissioners should be allowed to act
for district courts. 9
No matter what extension of the United States
judiciary receives jurisdiction, the "gap" cannot
be completely filled until some criminal code is
made applicable to the soldier outside the country
committing a non-military crime.s7 Whereas the
Uniform Code of Military Justice is a body of
federal law, there is no generally applicable civilian
federal code.' Congress must take action to either
extend the federal criminal code to military bases
located in foreign nations or allow federal district
courts to enforce the Uniform Code of Military
Justice." Either alternative is consistent with the
O'Callahan opinion.
The "new test" for jurisdiction as articulated
in O'Callahan consists of making a determination
as to the degree of connection present between
the crime and efficient military operations. Un-
fortunately, this test is more easily characterized
by the problems it creates than the rights it grants.
96 36 GEo. WASH. L. RIv. at 284 ff.
There is a federal criminal code for admiralty and
territories. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 7 (1964), 113 (1964), 114
(1964), 661 (1964), 1111 (1964), 1113 (1964), 2031
(1964), 2111 (1964), 2191-93 (1964).
"8 Military commanders on foreign bases have been
unable to apply any criminal sanctions against civilians
since 1960; and as a result, they feel this problem
especially acutely. They have been forced to apply
administrative sanctions such as suspension of 'PX"
privileges, confinement to post, or involuntary return
to the United States to cover the situation as well as
they can. See Note, 36 GEo. WASH. L. Ilv. at 279.
9 This type of jurisdiction is based on nationality
as opposed to territory, which is ordinarily the basis forjurisdiction. But, "there does not appear to be any
constitutional objection to giving the United States
District Courts jurisdiction of crimes committed by
Americans overseas," Current Legal Literature, 56
A.B.A.J. 193 (1970). There is also precedence for
nationalistic jurisdiction in American law. The U.S.
Code gives a federal district court the power to hear
cases arising out of the maritime jurisdiction whenever
such crime is committed outside the jurisdiction of any
state, 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1969) (The proper district court is
the accused's Port of Entry). And this section has held
to apply even when this nationalistic jurisdiction con-
flicts with the territorial jurisdiction of another nation,
U.S. v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933) (A United States
vessel was on a river 250 miles inside the Belgian Congo
unloading cargo).
Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina has introduced
legislation specifically giving a United States District
Court jurisdiction to hear cases involving discharged
servicemen, civilian dependents and government
employees with U.S. forces outside the country. 115
CONG. REc. 15169-72 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1969); Current
Legal Literature, 56 A.B.A.J. 193 (1970). This legisla-
tion could be broadened to apply to soldiers on active
duty as well.
NOTE
Although it may be argued that the Court made
a general statement so as to give the United States
Court of Military Appeals broad discretion, the
problems that remain are beyond the scope of a
mere interpretation of words. Not only is there
rather severe disagreement over the interpretation
of "service connection" in the court-martial
system itself, but also extra-national military
installations have a substantial potential problem
in implementing the Court's new test. Either
Congress or the Court must treat this decision as a
starting point for a general rethinking of military
jurisdiction.
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This note has argued throughout for a broad
interpretation of the decision not only because
the opinion pointed in that direction but more
importantly because the Supreme Court in recent
years has consistently insisted upon broad safe-
guards for accused individuals. 00 In this sense,
the opinion becomes a segment of this judicial
revolution, and it is best viewed in this light.
10 See e.g. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
(warning before arrest); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) (probable cause).
